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It’s a long way to Copenhagen 
Turkey’s Membership of and Convergence 
with the European Union 
Willem H. Buiter* 
 
On October 3, 2005, Turkey officially started 
negotiations for membership in the European 
Union. Whether Turkey becomes a full member 
of the EU is likely to be a defining decision, both 
for the existing EU members and for Turkey. The 
regional- and geo-political consequences of 
success or failure of the negotiations, and its 
cultural and ideological impact, are likely to be 
even more significant than its economic 
consequences, although even from an economic 
perspective the stakes are very high. Turkey’s 
population of over 70 million is larger than that 
of the ten countries that joined the EU on 1 May 
2004 combined. Unlike the EU-25 (and in 
particular the ten new member states), the 
Turkish population is young and growing. Its 
present per capita income is lower than that of 
any of the EU-25 countries – about at the level 
of Romania and Macedonia, using Purchasing 
Power Parity (PPP) estimates of per capita 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). However, with 
the right institutions and policies, Turkey could 
become a true tiger economy. But this is not 
guaranteed. With the institutions and policies of 
the second half of the 20
th century, it could end 
up a mangy cat instead of a tiger.  
 
 
* Willem H. Buiter, Professor of European Political 
Economy, European Institute, London School of 
Economics and Political Science. 
This policy brief elaborates on comments the author 
made at two presentations of the World Bank’s 2006 
Country Economic Memorandum for Turkey, in 
Ankara on 6 March 2006 and in Brussels at CEPS on 
9 March 2006. The author would like to thank Ahmet 
Akarli of Goldman Sachs International and Daniel 
Gros of CEPS for stimulating discussions on the 
subject matter of this note. The author alone is 
responsible for the arguments, conclusions and 
recommendations. 
This note is motivated by some rather optimistic 
official reports
1, and especially by the World Bank’s 
recent Country Economic Memorandum for Turkey 
Promoting Sustained Growth and Convergence with 
the European Union. On balance, I strike a somewhat 
more downbeat chord, although I believe that even 
my extended list of obstacles and problems can be 
handled by Turkey given sufficient ambition, 
determination and political courage. 
Normalisation brings with it recovery-easy 
growth 
Recent events encourage a tendency to describe 
Turkey as a country that, following truly spectacular 
macroeconomic mismanagement through most of the 
1990s (culminating in a complete loss of fiscal 
control at the end of that decade, accompanied by 
rampant inflation and, during 2000-2001, a collapse 
of the peculiar managed exchange rate regime of the 
time – a ‘crawling peg pseudo-currency board’ – and 
a banking crisis) has cleaned up its act as regards 
macroeconomic management and has also begun to 
address some of the overdue reforms in the banking 
sector and the social security system in a determined 
manner. 
And indeed, credit where credit is due. The 
government budget is under control. The Total Public 
Sector (International Monetary Fund definition) had a 
primary surplus of 7.1% of GDP in 2004 and of 6.5% 
in 2005. The gross public debt to GDP ratio has come 
down from a peak of 107.5% in 2001 (following the 
collapse of the real exchange rate) to 77.4 percent in 
2004 and 68.6% in 2005. The corresponding net 
government debt ratios are 63.5% in 2004 and 56.0% 
in 2005. Total (private plus public) external debt was 
53.5% of GDP in 2004 and 45.9% in 2005.
2 The 
                                                        
1 See in particular the (World Bank (2006a, 2006b), 
which is a good description of the recent economic 
performance of Turkey, its prospects and the challenges 
it faces. See also IMF (2005) and OECD (2005). 
2 Net external liabilities, which includes portfolio equity 
and FDI are considerably higher than net external debt. 
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central bank has been granted a significant degree of 
operational independence. Inflation is down to single 
digits and falling further. The country has adopted the 
only sensible exchange rate regime available to it: a 
managed float with no explicit or implicit target or 
band for the exchange rate, with intervention used 
only to dampen or lean against fluctuations that are 
deemed to be excessive. Growth has picked up: after 
a 7.5% fall in real GDP during 2001, annual real 
GDP growth has been 7.8% in 2002, 5.8% in 2003, 
8.9% in 2004 and 5.8% in 2005. Serious efforts have 
been undertaken to clean up both balance sheets and 
governance in the banking sector. 
Even more important, the commitment to sustainable 
fiscal-financial-monetary plans, the pursuit of low 
inflation and the creation of an operationally 
independent central bank have survived a change in 
government. These are no longer partisan issues. This 
therefore augurs well for their permanence. 
Finally, Turkey launched its EU accession 
negotiations on 3 October 2005. EU membership is a 
widely shared ambition throughout the Turkish 
polity. Since continued macroeconomic stability and 
further, deep structural reform are part of the 
conditionality for EU accession, this provides, for as 
long as eventual full EU membership is perceived as 
a realistic prospect, an important external incentive 
for persisting with both. 
So much for the good news. Let us now consider the 
complete picture. Normalisation and continued 
macroeconomic stability are necessary but not 
sufficient conditions for sustainable growth and 
eventual convergence with the productivity levels 
and standards of living of the rich West European 
nations. The almost eight per cent per annum average 
growth rate of GDP achieved during four years of 
recovery from a deep slump should not be confused 
with the sustainable growth of actual and potential 
output once the output gap has been closed. The 
closing of the output gap has now been achieved. It is 
therefore no surprise that the growth in output is 
slowing down, probably to no more that five per cent 
during 2006. Even that five per cent per annum 
growth rate is likely to be higher than what can be 
sustained by the Turkish economy without 
fundamental structural reform.  
Macroeconomic stability can never be 
taken for granted 
Like every other virtue, macroeconomic stability has 
to be fought for and defended every day. At just 
                                                                                       
liabilities is not contractually fixed – an important 
advantage to the issuer of such claims in an uncertain 
environment – they do represent a claim on Turkish 
resources during good times. 
under 70 percent of GDP, the gross public debt to 
GDP ratio is still high. In addition, it is still of short 
(albeit lengthening) maturity and about a third of it is 
denominated in foreign currencies or linked to the 
exchange rate. Roll-over risk therefore continues to 
exist and the public finances remain vulnerable to a 
sudden sharp depreciation of the real exchange rate. 
There also continues to be significant direct and 
indirect unhedged exchange rate exposure in the 
banking system. When banks hedge the currency risk 
associated with their hard-currency borrowing by 
lending in hard currency to domestic households or 
enterprises that do not hold natural or synthetic 
foreign currency hedges, the banks just exchange 
currency risk for credit risk. Despite the arm’s length 
relationship now supposed to exist between the 
government and the banks, there remains a possible 
implicit contingent exposure of the state to the 
banking sector. Taking all these facts into 
consideration, it is no accident that Turkey’s 
sovereign spread over US Treasuries Libor is 165 
basis points (bps – 7 March 2006), at about the same 
level as Brazil (168 bps) and Ukraine (164 bps). 
Turkey’s euro spread over bunds is 155 bps, 
compared to 23 bps for Poland. 
The budget deficit-reducing measures that restored 
macroeconomic stability mainly took the form of 
revenue increases. Public spending still amounts to 
40% of GDP, a very high level for a country at 
Turkey’s level of economic development and per 
capita income. What spending cuts there were fell 
disproportionately on the short-run easy option items 
of cuts in public sector capital formation and capital 
maintenance expenditures. The revenue increases 
were narrowly based: 75% of tax revenue now comes 
from indirect taxes; personal and corporate income 
tax revenues are low. Widespread informality (i.e. 
black market activity) narrows the tax base further. 
Effective policies for shifting employment and 
production into the formal sector require the carrot of 
increased perceived benefits to formalisation rather 
than enhanced harassment of informal sector activity. 
Among the benefits of operating in the formal sector 
are access to the court system and arbitration system, 
the protection of the law and access to formal sector 
finance. The value of these benefits depends on the 
quality of the judiciary and the depth and scope of the 
formal financial sector. Both still leave much to be 
desired.  
An increase in the relative size of the formal sector 
would also permit a lower tax and social security 
contributions ‘wedge’ between the marginal cost of 
labour to the employer and the net take-home pay of 
the worker. 
Of considerable concern in the longer term is the fact 
that the social security budget manages to run a 
deficit of 5% of GDP despite a young and growing It’s a long way to Copenhagen | 3 
 
labour force and generally favourable demographics. 
Reform of the social security system, probably 
beyond what the government is currently trying to 
legislate, is required, including a higher retirement 
age/pension benefit eligibility age and a clear formula 
for longevity risk sharing between current and future 
contributors and beneficiaries. Introducing such 
reforms now, before population ageing turns the age 
pyramid into an upside-down pyramid would be a 
major contribution to long-run fiscal sustainability.  
Sustainable growth is hard growth 
With the scope for easy growth that comes with 
economic recovery exhausted, the hard growth phase, 
that is the phase characterised by the balanced growth 
of actual and potential output, begins. The growth of 
potential output is driven by the growth of physical 
labour inputs, by broadly defined capital formation 
and by the growth of total factor productivity. 
What is the record of growth of productive potential 
and what are the prospects? Consider the following, 
sobering fact. In 1955 Turkey’s per capita income is 
estimated to have been roughly double that of South 
Korea. In 2003, Turkey’s per capita GDP ($6,772 at 
PPP exchange rates) was just over a third of that of 
South Korea ($17,971). Over 50 years South Korean 
GDP per capita thus increased six time more than that 
of Turkey. What went wrong in Turkey these past 50 
years? What can Turkey do to ensure that 50 years 
from now we do not look at a similar picture of long-
term economic underachievement? 
The problems (and the solutions they imply) can be 
summarised in two simple propositions. (1) Turkey 
invests too little. (2) The returns on investment are 
lower than they should be and could be because of 
the poor functioning of key markets (especially the 
formal labour markets and financial markets), and 
because of ineffective economic institutions and 
governance at all levels. Both propositions are 
exhaustively demonstrated and supported in the 
CEM. 
Investment 
As regards investment in physical capital by the 
private and public sectors, the picture is one of a very 
modest share of investment in GDP given the 
country’s stage of development
.3 As noted above, 
much of the (limited) spending cuts implemented by 
the government following the 2000-2001 crisis took 
the form of cuts in public sector capital formation 
                                                        
3 The data are of questionable accuracy; the saving 
should equal investment minus the current account 
deficit, but there are statistical discrepancies. 
(including key infrastructure projects) and cuts in 
infrastructure maintenance spending. 
Table 1. Saving, Investment and Current Account 
(% of GDP) 
  Gross 
saving 
rate 
Gross 
investment 
rate 
Current 
account 
deficit 
1998 22.7  23.6  -1.2 
1999 21.2    21.8  1.0 
2000 18.2  23.9  4.9 
2001 17.5  15.9  -2.4 
2002 19.2  21.3  0.9 
2003 19.3  22.8  3.4 
2004 20.2  25.9  5.1 
Source: GSI and Eurostat 
It is doubtful that a continuation of the average 
investment rate of the past seven years, documented 
in Table 1, will support a growth rate of potential 
output at the six to seven per cent annual rate 
required to achieve rapid convergence of per capita 
real GDP with that of the EU-25 let alone that of the 
EU-15. China, by comparison, invests more than 
40% of GDP. Raising Turkey’s investment rate to the 
30% to 35% rate likely to be required to achieve its 
growth ambitions will require a significant increase 
in the national saving rate, as it is unlikely that 
current account deficits of 10% to 15% of GDP are 
likely to be forthcoming in any sustainable manner. 
Current account deficits of the magnitude seen in the 
past couple of years (including the six per cent of 
GDP current account deficit likely to have been run 
during 2006) are in principle perfectly sustainable in 
an economy growing at a rate of five or six per cent 
per annum. The increase in the current account deficit 
since 2001 represents, statistically, increased 
investment rather than increased consumption. 
Indeed the national saving rate has risen slightly 
during the past four years. While investment is not 
guaranteed to generate returns at least equal, in 
present discounted value, to the cost of financing it, 
the fact that the recent increase in the current account 
deficit is the counterpart of increased private 
investment must be viewed as a positive. 
If Turkey’s investment rate is nothing to write home 
about, its saving rate is very low indeed for a country 
with Turkey’s demographic composition: Turkey is 
still a very young nation with a large share of its 
population of working (and saving) age and a small 
share of retirees. The government is running only a 
small financial deficit (similar in magnitude to its 
investment programme), so it is the private sector 
saving rate that is startlingly low – at a level 
characteristic of the old and ageing populations of 
western Europe, rather than of an emerging market 
with a still youthful population. 4 | Willem H. Buiter 
 
What can be done to raise the domestic saving rate? 
Apart from continued fiscal restraint, improvements 
in the financial asset menu available to private savers 
may help somewhat. The introduction of a mandatory 
retirement saving plan (defined contribution, 
individual accounts) for all employees, as a second 
pillar of the social security system, could also be 
helpful. It is unlikely that discretionary private saving 
would be reduced to offset the increase in mandatory 
retirement saving. There is little discretionary saving 
by workers, and negative discretionary saving 
(borrowing) is not an option available to most 
workers since unsecured borrowing by workers runs 
into the problem that future labour income cannot be 
hypothecated (banks cannot secure their lending with 
a legal claim on future wage income). 
Just as important as physical capital formation (if not 
more so) is human capital formation. Here the bad 
news is that Turkey underinvests in human capital 
(especially as regards the education and training of 
females) and underutilises what human capital it has 
(again especially the existing potential female labour 
supply). Turkey’s official unemployment rate 
(around 10% of the labour force), while too high, is 
not unusual by EU standards. What is unusual is the 
very low employment rate. Employment as a 
percentage of the population of working age – those 
of 15-64 years of age - is 46.1 percent. The female 
employment rate is extraordinarily low, at 24.3 
percent. Older workers too (those aged 55-64 years) 
have a very low employment rate of 33.1 percent, 
reflecting the high level of inactivity of this age 
group in the agricultural sector and widespread early 
retirement in the formal sector. 
Admittedly, these very low employment rates refer to 
formal sector employment rates. No doubt many of 
those classified as unemployed or inactive are 
engaged in some kind of productive activity. But 
such employment is not the stuff of which skill and 
knowledge-driven productivity growth is made.  
Turkey makes especially poor use of its female 
labour force potential. Women are more likely to be 
illiterate than men (81.1% of women were literate in 
2003, compared to 95.7% of men). The combined 
primary, secondary and tertiary school enrolment 
rates were 62% for girls and 74% for boys in 2002-
2003. The average combined enrolment rate was 68% 
in 2002/2003, about the same level as China (69%) 
and Iran (69%) (UNDP (2005)). Further evidence of 
systematic discrimination against women and girls is 
found in the UNDP’s Gender Empowerment 
Measure. The 2005 measure puts Turkey in 76
th place 
(out of 177), well below any other EU candidate 
country, including Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia and 
Macedonia. The UNDP’s Gender-Related 
Development Index for 2005 puts Turkey in 70
th 
place. 
It appears that, as regards the position of women and 
the role of women in economic life, Turkey is 
effectively a dual society and economy, with a 
traditional rural/agricultural society and economy and 
a modern, urban industrial and service-based society 
and economy. As shown in Dervis et. al. (2004), 
value added per person employed in agriculture is 
just one third of that in industry and an even smaller 
fraction of that in services. One contributor to this 
poor productivity performance of the agricultural 
sector is that those employed in the agricultural 
sector (about a third of the economy-wide work 
force) are significantly less educated than those in the 
industrial and urban service sectors. The gap is 
massive in the case of women: 28.5% of females 
employed in agriculture in 2003 were illiterate, 
against 8.5% of males employed in agriculture. The 
aggregate illiteracy rates in manufacturing 
employment was1.2%, in construction 2.6% and in 
trade and services 1.4%. Women do much better in 
tertiary education, with female students making up 
44% of the total student population.  
While education and training achievements are worse 
for women/girls than for men/boys, the problem of 
insufficient human capital formation affects 
men/boys also. In the enlarged EU, only Portugal has 
a worse educational performance record than Turkey. 
The inadequacies of primary and secondary 
education provision are also reflected in the poor 
PISA scores achieved by Turkish pupils, which were 
below the average OECD scores for mathematics, 
reading literacy, science and problem solving.
4. The 
overall educational achievements of the People’s 
Republic of China, for instance, are significantly 
better than that of Turkey, especially as regards 
primary and secondary education. Turkey cannot 
compete with China on wages. To compete 
effectively, it will have to compete through skills, 
education, innovation, technology transfer, 
infrastructure and economic governance and 
institutions, including the quality of the rule of law in 
economic affairs. 
Innovation and technology transfer can be speeded up 
greatly by attracting FDI. This has been happening 
for many years now (and 2005 saw net FDI inflows 
of 2.6% of GDP), but on too limited a scale. It would 
help to end FDI restrictions in civil aviation, 
maritime transport, mining and energy. 
What are the factors holding back investment, 
whether domestically financed or foreign? A key 
factor is the business climate, as is evident from the 
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance 
Surveys (BEEPS) conducted by the World Bank in 
Turkey (World Bank (2006d)), and from the World 
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Bank’s Doing Business database (World Bank 
(2006c)). Much of the evidence is surveyed in the 
CEM.  
Other sources of information confirm the picture of 
serious pathologies in the business and enterprise 
environment. The 2005 Corruption Perceptions Index 
ranks Turkey joint 65
th (out of 158) with Ghana, 
Mexico, Panama and Peru. On this index, Turkey 
does score better, however, than Croatia, Poland, 
Romania and Macedonia. 
The Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic 
Freedom for 2006 puts Turkey in 88
th position. Of the 
EU members and candidates, only Romania ranks 
lower (in 93
rd position). In the 2005 Growth 
Competitiveness Index of the World Economic 
Forum, Turkey comes in 66
th position, one place 
ahead of Romania and well ahead of Macedonia 
(85
th). 
All these complementary measures of the quality of 
the institutions governing economic life tell a 
consistent story – a story that is reinforced by the 
message conveyed by prima facie more ‘political’ 
criteria. For instance, the 2005 Annual Worldwide 
Press Freedom Index put together by Reporters sans 
frontières, puts Turkey in 98
th place out of 167 
countries. This is a significant improvement over 
2004, when Turkey came 113
th out of 167, but still a 
long way from meeting the standards set by the 
political Copenhagen criteria.  
There is of course, a direct economic dimension to 
the lack of media freedom in Turkey. The two most 
effective weapons against corruption are (1) taking 
away the sources of the rents that public officials 
control (that is the opaque use of discretionary power 
to allocate rents) through de-regulation, liberalisation, 
uniform tariffs etc and (2) the existence of free media 
and a vocal civil society. 
Conclusion: Prioritising and sequencing 
reforms – The role of the EU accession 
process 
Turkey’s negotiations for EU membership will be 
long and their ultimate successful conclusion is by no 
means assured. Even if in due course all political, 
economic and administrative (acquis-related) 
Copenhagen conditionalities are met, purely political 
obstacles remain. The commitment by the French 
President to have a referendum on Turkish EU 
membership is a serious obstacle to Turkish 
membership – a ‘Doomsday machine’ unleashed to 
stop Turkish accession.  
As Turkey’s EU membership is not a ‘done deal’, 
Turkey must have/prepare a ‘Plan B’ for the 
eventuality that full EU membership is never 
achieved. For domestic political reasons in Turkey 
and so as not to weaken Turkey’s negotiating 
position, the existence of a Plan B may never be 
publicly acknowledged.  
The political and administrative capacity to introduce 
and implement structural reform is limited, so 
reforms would have to be sequenced rather than 
implemented comprehensively in one fell swoop. 
Because the eventual success of the accession 
negotiations is by no means assured, it makes sense 
not to put all structural reform eggs in the EU basket, 
but instead to concentrate on those reforms that make 
sense regardless of whether and when the EU 
accession negotiations are successful. With both 
administrative implementation capital and political 
capital in short supply, the timing and sequencing of 
reforms is a crucial issue. 
Much of the body of reforms required to qualify for 
EU membership makes good development sense, but 
not all of it does. The unqualified pursuit and 
implementation of EU accession priorities would, 
from the perspective of successful economic 
development, be subject to both type I errors (errors 
of commission) and type II errors (errors of 
omission). 
The  acquis indeed contains much that is desirable 
from the point of view of economic development and 
the creation of a better functioning market economy. 
For instance, Turkey should enthusiastically pursue 
any approach that enhances competition for markets 
and within the market place, by lowering barriers to 
entry and exit. It should aggressively implement 
services liberalisation. It should end state aid to the 
vast majority of enterprises that currently benefit 
from it – all those for which no convincing 
decreasing cost or public good argument for the 
subsidies can be made. It should privatise the 
remaining profitable SOEs, including the state-owned 
banks) and close the rest. It should open all its 
markets to imports from abroad (here the Common 
External Tariff of the EU is a development negative). 
It should aggressively liberalise its formal sector 
labour markets. Meeting the political Copenhagen 
criteria would have important economic benefits, in 
addition to the intrinsic benefits of becoming a more 
open, free and democratic society which respects 
civil liberties and human rights.  
In order to avoid Type I errors, Turkey should not 
spend a lot of time and resources on adopting or 
preparing for the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP), not just because the CAP (even in its latest 
incarnation) is both inefficient and inequitable, but 
because the post-2013 CAP is bound to be very 
different from the current CAP. Turkey should not 
introduce labour cost increasing measures like the 
EU’s Working Time Directive, and other features of 6 | Willem H. Buiter 
 
the Social Chapter
5, some of which would be 
premature and some of which would be undesirable 
over any time horizon. It should also not invest vast 
amounts on environmental projects that are 
premature from an economic development point of 
view. For Turkey, the best environmental policy is 
pricing energy and water at long-run incremental cost 
to all users, households, industry and agriculture. 
This will also help the budget by eliminating sources 
of quasi-fiscal deficits. 
As regards avoiding Type II errors, the logic of 
economic development also requires urgent action in 
a number of key fields (financing of infrastructure 
investment, pricing of utilities and of infrastructure 
services, social security, education and training to 
name but a few) beyond what is required for EU 
membership. Turkey should not avoid prioritising 
these key areas simply because they do not figure 
prominently in the acquis. 
Turkey’s future is almost entirely in its own hands. 
Financial aid, whether from the World Bank or from 
the EU is not essential. Aid, including EU pre-
accession funds, can be helpful, but in practice, in 
Turkey and elsewhere, misdirected, poorly 
administered aid has often done more harm than good 
– encouraging waste and corruption. 
The main way in which the EU could help Turkey is 
to grant unconditional market access now to the EU 
for all Turkish goods and services, including 
agricultural products. Anything less would mean that 
the EU’s professed support for Turkey is cheap talk. 
Turkey itself is the only party that can create the 
conditions for increased and increasingly efficient 
domestic capital formation and for attracting more 
FDI. 
Whether market access to the EU together with free 
financial capital mobility and unrestricted FDI are 
complete substitutes for labour mobility remains an 
open question. Other than granting immediate and 
unconditional market access, the only significant 
contribution the EU can make to Turkish economic 
wellbeing is to open the door to a much greater extent 
to both short-term and long-term migration from 
Turkey. 
 
 
 
                                                        
5 Chapter 13, Employment and Social Policy. 
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publications and the talent and prescience of its expanding research staff. The CEPS research 
programme is organised under two major headings: 
Economic Policy  Politics, Institutions and Security 
Macroeconomic Policy  The Future of Europe 
European Network of Economic Policy  Justice and Home Affairs 
 Research Institutes (ENEPRI) The  Wider  Europe 
Financial Markets, Company Law & Taxation  South-East Europe 
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI)  Caucasus & Black Sea 
Trade Developments & Policy  EU-Russian/Ukraine Relations 
Energy, Environment & Climate Change   Mediterranean & Middle East 
Agricultural Policy  CEPS-IISS European Security Forum 
In addition to these two sets of research programmes, the Centre organises a variety of activities 
within the CEPS Policy Forum. These include CEPS task forces, lunchtime membership meetings, 
network meetings abroad, board-level briefings for CEPS corporate members, conferences, training 
seminars, major annual events (e.g. the CEPS International Advisory Council) and internet and 
media relations. 